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LIGHTENING THE LOAD: WHETHER THE
BURDEN OF PROOF FOR OVERCOMING A
PATENT'S PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY
SHOULD BE LOWERED
Kristen Dietly*
Patents fuel innovation and are becoming an ever-more important form
of protection in this technological age. Society also has a vested interest in
only valid patents being issued and enforced. Patents are presumed valid
once they are issued and also currently enjoy the application of a heavy
burden of proof-clear and convincing evidence-to overcome that
presumption when their validity is questioned at trial. This burden has
started to be questioned as the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office becomes
more taxed by the increasing influx of patent applications. Current
precedent conflicts with past precedent and with general principles of
administrative law. This Note argues that the application of a clear and
convincing burden of proof should be revisited and ultimately lowered to a
preponderance of the evidence standard in order to only enforce valid
patents.
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INTRODUCTION
It is just as important that a good patent be ultimately upheld as that a bad
one be definitively stricken.1
The Patent Act is codified in Title 35 of the United States Code.2 Section
282 specifically states that "[a] patent shall be presumed valid."'3 Section
282 also specifically lays out the defenses available in any patent
infringement action, including those involving invalidity issues.4 In a
1. Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. United States, 372 F.2d 969, 978 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
2. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2006).
3. Id. § 282.
4. Id. These defenses are
(1) Noninfringement, absence of liability for infringement or unenforceability,
(2) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit on any ground specified in part
II of this title as a condition for patentability,
(3) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit for failure to comply with any
requirement of sections 112 or 25 1 of this title,
(4) Any other fact or act made a defense by this title.
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patent infringement litigation, the burden of "establishing invalidity of a
patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such
invalidity."5 Notably, however, the statute does not mention the standard of
proof required to satisfy that burden.6
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has long held that the
party asserting invalidity must overcome the presumption with clear and
convincing evidence. 7 In a recent report, however, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) made recommendations for patent system reform. 8
This report specifically recommended that the burden of proof to show the
invalidity of an issued patent should be lowered from clear and convincing
evidence to the normal civil standard of a preponderance of the evidence. 9
This Note addresses the conflict regarding what burden of proof should
be required to overcome a patent's presumption of validity. Part I examines
the patent system in general, as well as burdens of proof, presumptions, and
their operation. In addition, this part provides an overview of
administrative law as it applies to patent law. Part II examines the
historical evolution of case law surrounding the presumption of validity in
the various courts of appeals. Specifically, this part highlights the conflict
among the pre-Federal Circuit courts regarding the burden of proof
required to overcome the presumption. It also surveys relevant case law in
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the Federal Circuit, and finally in
the U.S. Supreme Court.
Part III argues that the courts should revisit the application of a clear and
convincing standard of proof. Part III also asserts that the burden should
then be lowered to the normal civil burden of a preponderance of the
evidence. This change is supported by pre-Federal Circuit precedent,
administrative deference due to Patent Office decisions, and general policy
considerations that affect the choice of the applicable burden of proof.
I. THE PATENT SYSTEM, PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS, AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Part L.A discusses the patent system in general. Specifically, Part I.A. 1
examines the patenting process, and Part I.A.2 explains the mechanisms for
review of U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) patent decisions:
judicial review and internal PTO procedures. Part I.A.3 provides an
overview of patent litigation, and Part I.A.4 discusses patent reform efforts.
Part I.B explains the basic concepts of burdens of proof and presumptions.
Part I.C discusses general principles of administrative law and their
5. Id.
6. See id.
7. See, e.g., Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1573
(Fed. Cir. 1984) ("[O]ne attacking validity has the burden of proving invalidity by clear and
convincing evidence.").
8. FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003).
9. Id. Executive Summary at 8.
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application to patent law. In particular, Part I.C. 1 explains judicial review
of an administrative agency's legal determinations, and Part I.C.2 covers
judicial review of factual findings.
A. The Patent System
The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to "promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."' 0 A patent secures this exclusive right by granting the "right
to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the
invention throughout the United States or importing the invention."11 This
limited monopoly right lasts for twenty years from the date the patent
application was filed in the United States. 12 The federal patent system
"embodies a carefully crafted bargain" by balancing "creation and
disclosure" with the "exclusive right" conferred by a patent.13 It balances
monopolies-which are disfavored because they "stifle competition"-with
the "need to encourage innovation."1 4 The Patent Act, which sets forth the
rules governing the patent system, is codified in Title 35 of the United
States Code. 15  Part I.A.1 discusses the requirements and process for
obtaining a patent.
1. The Patenting Process
To obtain a patent, the inventor must submit a patent application to the
PTO. 16 A PTO examiner will then determine whether the invention
complies with the conditions of patentability and will either award a
patent' 7 or notify the applicant of a rejection.' 8  The PTO examines
thousands of patent applications per year; in fact, 485,312 patent
applications were filed in 2008.19 The roughly 6000 patent examiners
employed by the PTO spend an average of only eighteen hours over a two-
to three-year period examining each patent application. 20 The backlog in
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
11. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1).
12. Id. § 154(a)(2).
13. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989); see
also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974) (stating that public
disclosure is "the quidpro quo of the right to exclude" (citing Universal Oil Prods. Co. v.
Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944))).
14. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146.
15. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376.
16. See id. § 2(b)(1) (mandating that the PTO "shall adopt and use a seal of the
Office... with which letters patent[s] ... shall be authenticated").
17. Id. § 131.
18. Id. § 132.
19. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, ELEC. INFO. PRODS. Div., U.S. PATENT
STATISTICS CHART: CALENDAR YEARS 1963-2008 (2009), http://www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us-stat.htm.
20. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, USPTO PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 11 (2009), available at http://www.uspto.gov/
2618 [Vol. 78
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the PTO is quite large; as of fiscal year 2009 there were 718,835 patent
applications awaiting a first action from an examiner.21
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides that "any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof' is eligible for a patent.22 In order to obtain a patent,
however, the invention must be new, useful, and nonobvious.23 A patent
confers property rights, the boundaries of which are defined by the claims
of the patent.24  The claims are the "precise legal definition of the
invention." 25
An invention must satisfy five requirements in order to be patentable: it
is patentable subject matter; it does not already exist; it is useful; it is not
obvious with respect to prior art; and it is sufficiently disclosed and
described in the patent application to enable others to make and use it.26
The "novelty" requirement means that no identical invention already
exists.27 An invention is not novel if it was known or used by others before
the invention or if it was made or sold more than one year before the
application was filed.28 Information that renders an invention non-novel is
said to anticipate the invention. 29 The requirement that the invention be
useful is not difficult to satisfy; the PTO will not deny a patent for lack of
utility unless it has "absolutely no 'practical utility."' 30  To be
"nonobvious," the invention must make more than a trivial advance over
the prior art. 31 The nonobviousness requirement is the most important
because it attempts to ensure that the invention is a "big enough technical
advance" to warrant a patent.32
about/stratplan/ar/2009/2009annualreport.pdf (noting that the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) employed 6243 patent examiners in fiscal year 2009); John R. Allison & Mark
A. Lemley, Who's Patenting What? An Empirical Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53
VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2101 (2000) (giving the average time that a patent takes to issue as 2.77
years as of 2000); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1495, 1500 (2001) (estimating that the average patent application is only examined for
eighteen hours).
21. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT INVENTORY STATISTICS-FY09 (2009),
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/stats/appbacklog.jsp.
22. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
23. Id. §§ 101-103.
24. See ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 125 (rev. 4th ed. 2007).
25. Id.
26. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (requiring patentable subject matter and utility); id. § 102
(requiring novelty); id. § 103 (requiring nonobviousness); id. § 112 (requiring enablement);
see also MERGES ET AL., supra note 24, at 124-25.
27. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 24, at 124.
28. See 35 U.S.C. § 102; MERGES ET AL., supra note 24, at 124.
29. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 360 (4th ed. 2007).
30. MERGES ET AL., supra note 24, at 124. The utility requirement is rarely an issue
during a patent's examination in the PTO and is also rarely a defense asserted during
infringement litigation. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 29, at 207.
31. See 35 U.S.C. § 103; MERGES ET AL., supra note 24, at 124.
32. MERGES ET AL., supra note 24, at 124.
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The last major requirement, enablement, requires the patent application
to describe the invention well enough that one "skilled in the art" could
make and use the invention. 33 The enablement requirement demonstrates
concern for the public, ensuring that those in the field can understand the
invention and that when the patent expires the public will have sufficient
knowledge to make and use it.34 Related to enablement is the written
description requirement, which requires that the applicant show that he was
"in possession" of the invention at the time of filing.35  Lastly, this
requirement mandates that the patent disclose what the inventor considers
the "best mode" of practicing the invention. 36
2. Review of Decisions
During examination of the patent application, if any claim is rejected
twice, a patent applicant may appeal the rejection to the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences (the Board).37 An applicant may then appeal an
adverse decision by the Board to the Federal Circuit, which has exclusive
jurisdiction over such appeals. 38
When reviewing an examiner's or a court's decision, findings of fact are
reviewed for substantial evidence while legal conclusions are reviewed de
novo.39 Whether a patent is anticipated-and thus not novel-is a question
of fact.40 Usefulness is also reviewed as a question of fact.4' Whether the
invention is obvious, however, is "a legal conclusion based on factual
determinations." 42 Notably, the Supreme Court has held that a court, or the
PTO, should make "several basic factual inquiries" when deciding the issue
of obviousness.43 These factual inquiries are "the scope and content of the
prior art," "differences between the prior art and the claims at issue," and
"the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art."'44 In addition, the Court
explained that certain "secondary considerations [such] as commercial
success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc.," may also be
relevant in determining if an invention is obvious. 45
33. 35 U.S.C. § 112; see MERGES ET AL., supra note 24, at 124-25.
34. See MERGES'ET AL., supra note 24, at 124-25.
35. See 35 U.S.C. § 112; MERGES ET AL., supra note 24, at 173.
36. See 35 U.S.C. § 112; MERGES ET AL., supra note 24, at 182-83.
37. 35 U.S.C. § 134(a). The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (the Board) is a
part of the PTO. Id. § 6(a). The Board "shall, on written appeal of an applicant, review
adverse decisions of examiners upon applications for patents." Id. § 6(b).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) (2006); 35 U.S.C. § 141. For a discussion of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction, see infra Part I.A.3.
39. See In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
40. Schumer v. Lab. Computer Sys., Inc., 308 F.3d 1304, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
41. Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
42. Aktiebolaget Karlstads Mekaniska Werkstad v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 705 F.2d
1565, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
43. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 17-18.
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3. Validity Issues in Patent Litigation
Anyone who, "without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells" a
patented invention in the United States, or imports a patented invention into
the United States, infringes the patent.46 Once a patent has issued, a
patentee "shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his
patent. '47 In a civil action, a court can award either damages 48 or an
injunction (preliminary or permanent), or both.49  The patent statutes,
however, do not provide for criminal prosecution. 50
The federal district courts have "original jurisdiction of any civil action
arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents. ' 51 Prior to 1982, the
various U.S. courts of appeals had jurisdiction over appeals from the district
courts.
52
In 1929, Congress transferred jurisdiction of appeals of PTO decisions
from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to the U.S.
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA). 53 The CCPA heard cases
involving patents, requiring it to deal with questions involving patentability,
validity, and infringement, among other things. 54
The CCPA had jurisdiction over appeals from the PTO until Congress
passed the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982. 55 The Act created the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, an appellate court with nearly
exclusive jurisdiction over any claims involving patents.5 6 When it was
46. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). In addition, actively inducing infringement leads to
liability as an infringer, and contributory infringement is also possible. Id. § 271(b), (c).
47. Id. § 281.
48. Id. §§ 284, 289. A court may also, in "exceptional cases," award attorney's fees. Id.
§ 285.
49. See id. § 283; 8 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.01, at 20-7 (2009).
50. See Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 227 n.19 (1985) ("Congress instead has
relied on provisions affording patent owners a civil cause of action." (citing 35 U.S.C.
§§ 281-294)).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006).
52. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 127, 96 Stat. 25,
37-38 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (transferring jurisdiction of patent
appeals to the Federal Circuit); see 28 U.S.C. § 1291 ("The courts of appeals ... shall have
jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States.").
53. Act to Change the Title of the United States Court of Customs Appeals, Pub. L. No.
70-914, 45 Stat. 1475-76 (1929).
54. See 8 CHISuM, supra note 49, § 21.02[5][b][i], at 21-407 (explaining that the U.S.
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) was one of the "predecessor courts" to the
Federal Circuit).
55. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 §§ 122, 127 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1295
to give jurisdiction over appeals from the PTO to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit and abolishing the CCPA).
56. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (granting exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal Circuit for
appeals from district courts for cases where jurisdiction was founded on § 1338). Section
1338 grants original jurisdiction to the district courts for civil actions "arising under any Act
of Congress relating to patents." Id. § 1338(a). Importantly, the U.S. Supreme Court has
held that the Federal Circuit does not have jurisdiction over an appeal when the patent claims
arose only as counterclaims by the defendant. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vomado Air
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established, the Federal Circuit merged the CCPA and the appellate division
of the U.S. Court of Claims. 57 The Federal Circuit's first decision adopted
the bodies of law of these two courts as precedent. 58 Thus, the Federal
Circuit now has jurisdiction over appeals from the various federal district
courts as well as appeals directly from the PTO. 59
The standard patent suit involves the patent owner on one side and the
alleged infringer on the other.60  Patent interests- may be transferred,
however, and thus the question of who may bring a suit against an infringer
and whom must be joined in the suit can become quite complex. 61
Important to this Note is that parties in patent litigation are usually in
dispute over the validity and infringement of the relevant patent or
patents. 62
From as early as 1924, courts recognized the presumptive validity of
issued patents. 63  At the same time, the Court recognized that the
presumption was not conclusive and thus could be rebutted by contrary
evidence. 64 In 1952, the Patent Act codified the presumption of validity
that attaches to an issued patent.65 The statute simplified the "morass of
case law" regarding the presumption of patent validity. 66 Section 282 of the
Patent Act specifically states that "[a] patent shall be presumed valid. '67
The Federal Circuit has not been clear about the basis for this presumption;
some cases have based the presumption on deference to the PTO, while
Circulation Sys,, Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 834 (2002) (stating that jurisdiction is founded on
"whether a patent-law claim appears on the face of the plaintiffs well-pleaded complaint").
57. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 §§ 122, 127. The U.S. Court of Claims
was originally created in 1855 to hear claims against the government. See U.S. COURT OF
FED. CLAIMS, THE PEOPLE'S COURT 2, available at http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/court info/CourtHistoryBrochure.pdf The Federal Courts Improvement
Act transferred the jurisdiction of the court's appellate level and created the modem, and still
existing, trial division of the U.S. Claims Court. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982
§§ 105, 127; see also U.S. COURT OF FED. CLAIMS, supra, at 10.
58. S. Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
59. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295.
60. See 8 CHISuM, supra note 49, § 21.03, at 21-463.
61. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006) ("Applications for patent, patents, or any interest therein,
shall be assignable ...."); 8 CHISUM, supra note 49, § 21.03, at 21-463. The complex issues
surrounding the proper parties to a suit, however, are outside the scope of this Note.
62. 6 CHIsUM, supra note 49, § 19.02[l], at 19-14; see also Kimberly A. Moore, Judges,
Juries, and Patent Cases-An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REv. 365,
389-90 (2000) (reporting that of the 1209 patent cases going to trial between 1983 and 1999,
1151 validity decisions and 1359 infringement decisions were made by the fact finder).
63. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Formica Insulation Co., 266 U.S. 342, 348 (1924)
("The patent of the exclusive right against the public carries with it a presumption of its
validity.").
64. Id.
65. Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 282, 66 Stat. 792 (codified in scattered
sections of 35 U.S.C.).
66. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons., Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
67. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006). Each individual claim of a patent is also presumed valid
independently of the validity of all other claims. Id.
2622 [Vol. 78
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other cases indicate that deference is only part of the basis.68 Some cases
even assert that administrative correctness is in fact the origin, not just the
basis, of the presumption.69
A patent's validity can become an issue in litigation in multiple ways. A
plaintiff may bring an action in federal court seeking a declaratory
judgment that a patent is invalid. 70 More commonly, however, a defendant
will defend an allegation of infringement on the grounds of invalidity. 71
Invalidity is most often asserted based on obviousness, 72 but the
presumption of validity is applicable to all of the possible grounds of
invalidity.73 Invalidity may be asserted for multiple reasons, and, thus, a
court may consider all of the elements of patent validity considered by the
PTO. 7
4
The defense of patent invalidity must be pleaded; 75 however the Supreme
Court has indicated that a court may, and possibly even must, raise the issue
of validity on its own motion if the complaint alleges infringement. 76 The
burden of "establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest
68. Compare Applied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am., Inc.,
98 F.3d 1563, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("The presumption of validity is based on the
presumption of administrative correctness of actions of the agency charged with examination
of patentability."), with Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555,
1574 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("[The] presumption is based in part on the expertise of patent
examiners presumed to have done their job.").
69. Paltex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 605 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting that the
presumption's "origin is the presumption of administrative correctness").
70. See, e.g., MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007) (holding
that "petitioner was not required ... to break or terminate its 1997 license agreement before
seeking declaratory judgment in federal court that the underlying patent is invalid,
unenforceable, or not infringed").
71. 35 U.S.C. § 282. Section 282 specifically lays out the defenses available
in any action involving the validity or infringement of a patent... :
(1) Noninfringement, absence of liability for infringement or unenforceability,
(2) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit on any ground specified in part
II of this title as a condition for patentability,
(3) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit for failure to comply with any
requirement of sections 112 or 251 of this title,
(4) Any other fact or act made a defense by this title.
Id.
72. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 194, 207-10 (1998) (finding that of 299 litigated
patents with final decisions on validity from early 1989 to 1996, 160 involved obviousness
invalidity arguments); see also 6 CHISUM, supra note 49, § 19.02, at 19-14 (discussing
invalidity as a defense in patent infringement litigation).
73. Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see also
supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text.
74. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 24, at 162; see also supra notes 26-36 and
accompanying text.
75. 35 U.S.C. § 282.
76. Slawson v. Grand Street R.R., 107 U.S. 649, 652 (1883) ("If [letters patents] are
void ... it is the duty of the court to dismiss the cause on that ground whether the defence be
made or not.").
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on the party asserting such invalidity. ' 77 The statute does not mention the
standard of proof required to satisfy that burden. 78
The issues in patent litigation are important to both the parties involved
and to the public. 79 As the court has recognized, "[i]t is just as important
that a good patent be ultimately upheld as that a bad one be definitively
stricken."' 80 Although infringement and validity are often litigated together,
they are separate issues and "of the two questions, validity has the greater
public importance." 81 In fact, since Lear, Inc. v. Adkins,82 patent law "has
affirmatively encouraged litigation challenges to the validity of granted
patents." 83 In that case, the Supreme Court acknowledged a "strong public
policy in invalidating invalid patents," a policy that overrode the contract
interests involved. 84  Ultimately, the public has a strong interest in
invalidating "bad" patents (ones that should never have issued) because the
existence of invalid patents can undermine the policies of patent law. 85
4. Recent Patent Reform
In 2005, Representative Lamar Smith introduced the Patent Reform Act
of 2005.86 The bill proposed multiple reforms for patent law, but none
regarding the presumption of validity.87 The bill was not passed and similar
bills have been proposed in subsequent Congresses.88 These more recent
bills have suggested amendment of § 282-the section of the Patent Act
that codifies the presumption of validity-but purely on technical
grounds. 89 However, Congress is aware of the issue regarding the burden
of proof necessary to rebut the presumption of patent validity because it has
77. 35 U.S.C. § 282.
78. Id.
79. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 331 n.21
(1971) (quoting Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. United States, 372 F.2d 969, 977-78
(Ct. Cl. 1967)).
80. Technograph Printed Circuits, 372 F.2d at 978.
81. Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330 (1945) (citing
Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1943)).
82. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
83. Joshua D. Sarnoff, Bilcare, KSR, Presumptions of Validity, Preliminary Relief and
Obviousness in Patent Law, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 995, 1044 (2008).
84. Sarnoff, supra note 83, at 1045 (arguing that this policy favoring validity challenges
"would seem to be even stronger where such contractual fairness concerns were not
applicable"); see Lear, 395 U.S. at 672-73 (holding that licensor's rights cannot
"substantial[ly] impair[] ... overriding federal policy").
85. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 8, Executive Summary at 3.
86. See Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005).
87. See id.
88. See Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009) (as reported by Mr.
Leahy, with amendments, Apr. 2, 2009); Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong.
(2008); Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007); Patent Reform Act of
2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. (2006).
89. See Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 11 1th Cong. § 16(f) (2009) (amending § 282
by, for example, changing the language "A patent" to "IN GENERAL.-A patent"); Patent
Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 12(b)(1) (2007) (same).
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heard testimony that the heightened burden should be reduced.90 The next
section of this Note will explain burdens of proof and legal presumptions in
more detail.
B. Proof Persuasion, and Presumptions
1. The Burden of Proof
The "burden of proof' is "[a] party's duty to prove a disputed
assertion." 9 1 This burden "includes both the burden of persuasion and the
burden of production." 92 Once a suit is brought, the plaintiff usually has the
burden of persuasion. 93 Therefore, the plaintiff must persuade the trier of
fact, either a judge or jury, of the merits of his case with some prescribed
degree of certainty.94 Substantive law determines which party has the
burden of persuasion, and the burden remains with that party throughout the
trial. 95
The party with the burden of persuasion also usually has the burden of
production, meaning that he must produce evidence to show that he is
entitled to relief.96 A federal court may grant a motion for judgment against
a party that fails to satisfy the burden of production with respect to a claim
or a defense. 97 Burdens of production can shift throughout a trial.98
There is no Federal Rule of Evidence assigning the burden of proof to a
specific party in litigation.99 Assignment of the burden generally reflects
policies in substantive law, but courts often mechanically assign the
burden. 100 When assigning the burden, courts first consider the policy of
the substantive law at issue, sometimes "put[ting] a finger on the scales" to
90. See, e.g., American Innovation at Risk. The Case for Patent Reform: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 36 (2007) (statement of Daniel Ravicher, Executive Director,
Public Patent Foundation) (recommending that the Federal Circuit's "super presumption of
validity" be eliminated); Patent Trolls: Fact or Fiction?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 32 (2006) (statement of Chuck Fish, Vice President and Chief Patent Counsel, Time
Warner, Inc.) (advocating that a preponderance of the evidence standard should be applied to
invalidate a patent where prior art was not considered by the PTO).
91. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 223 (9th ed. 2009).
92. Id. (emphasis omitted) (explaining that although the term "burden of proof' has been
used in two different senses, the present trend is to use the term only in the sense of
"'carrying the risk of nonpersuasion' (quoting ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE,
CRIMINAL LAW 78 (3d ed. 1982))).
93. LINDA J. SILBERMAN, ALLAN R. STEIN & TOBIAS BARRINGTON WOLFF, CIVIL
PROCEDURE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 10 (2d ed. 2006).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a); see 3 FEDERAL LITIGATION GUIDE § 25.11[1]-[2] (2009).
98. SILBERMAN ET AL., supra note 93, at 10.
99. 21 B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5122, at 399 (2d ed. 2005).
100. Id. § 5122, at 402-04 (giving examples of courts' formal rules assigning burdens).
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tip the balance in favor of the party furthering the policy behind a specific
law or "plac[ing] hurdles" in front of a party advocating a position
disfavored by the policy.10' Second, courts consider a party's probability of
success in the specific situation and tend to assign the burden to the party
asserting the least likely facts. 102 Finally, courts consider access to facts
necessary to satisfy the burden of proof and tend to assign the burden to the
party with superior access. 103
Substantive law also fixes the weight of the burden of proof.104 Courts
must assign the weight of the burden of proof when Congress or the
Constitution has not prescribed one. 105 Even if the standard of proof does
not greatly affect the outcome in a particular case, selecting a standard "' [at
a minimum] reflects the value society places"' on the rights in question. 106
The heaviest burden is proof "beyond a reasonable doubt."' 0 7 This burden
is applied only in criminal cases and reflects society's strong aversion to
convicting innocent people. 108  The lowest burden is proof by a
"preponderance of the evidence."1 09 This low burden is the usual burden of
proof in civil cases. 110 In federal courts, proof by a preponderance of the
evidence means proof that leads a jury considering all of the evidence to
find that a disputed fact is more likely true than not.11' This burden is the
default, and if a jury "cannot decide who should win, the party with the
burden of persuasion loses." 112  Between these two standards is the
intermediate standard of "clear and convincing evidence." 113 "Clear and
convincing evidence" is "evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is
highly probable or reasonably certain." 1 14 The Supreme Court has applied
the clear and convincing standard in cases involving "important liberty
interests." 115  Lower courts have also applied the clear and convincing
101. Id. § 5122, at403.
102. Id.
103. Id. § 5122, at 403-04.
104. Id. § 5122, at 405-06.
105. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983) (citations omitted).
106. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (alteration in original) (quoting
Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1166 (4th Cir. 1971) (Sobeloff, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part)).
107. 21 B WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 99, § 5122, at 406.
108. Id. ("[C]onvictions of the innocent threaten the legitimacy of the criminal justice,
and by implication, the state itself.").
109. Id. § 5122, at 409. There are "sub-preponderance" standards, but they are less
common and not of great importance for purposes of this Note. Id. § 5122, at 410-11.
110. SILBERMAN ET AL., supra note 93, at 10.
111. 3 FEDERAL LITIGATION GUIDE, supra note 97, § 25.11 [4]. A "preponderance of the
evidence" is evidence "not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, [yet]
is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the
other." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 91, at 1301.
112. 21B WRIGHT& GRAHAM, supra note 99, § 5122, at 410.
113. Id. § 5122, at 406-08.
114. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 91, at 636.
115. 21B WRIGHT& GRAHAM,supra note 99, § 5122, at 407; see Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 769-70 (1982) (holding that a clear and convincing evidence standard applied to a
case depriving parents of their parental rights over children); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
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standard in both cases involving important liberty interests and in patent
cases.l 16
In Addington v. Texas, 117 the Supreme Court provided guidance on the
three differing standards of proof when it was faced with deciding what
standard of proof the Fourteenth Amendment required in a state-law civil
case brought to involuntarily commit a person to a state mental hospital." 18
The Court explained that the "function of the standard of proof. . . is to
'instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society
thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a
particular type of adjudication." '119 Further, it explained that the weight of
the burden of proof "allocate[s] the risk of error between the litigants
and... indicate[s] the relative importance attached to the ultimate
decision." 120
The Court then discussed the three levels of proof and society's interest
in the adjudication of the cases in which each standard is applied. 121 At the
low end of the burden spectrum is the "typical civil case," namely, private
parties disputing over money.' 22  In these cases, the Court explained,
society has "minimal concern" about the outcome, and thus the burden is a
"mere" preponderance of the evidence. 123 On the opposite end are criminal
cases, in which the defendant's interests are "of such magnitude" that proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is required. 124 The Court then identified the
intermediate burden of proof, clear and convincing evidence. 125 According
to the Court, a "typical use" of the clear and convincing standard is in civil
cases when fraud or other "quasi-criminal" behavior is involved. 126 The
Court recognized that it had also applied the intermediate standard to
"protect particularly important individual interests." 127
418, 432-33 (1979) (holding that the Due Process Clause required a clear and convincing
evidence standard to be applied in a civil proceeding to commit a person to a state mental
hospital).
116. 21B WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 99, § 5122, at 408; see Am. Hoist & Derrick
Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (applying a clear and
convincing evidence standard to claim that a patent is invalid); NLRB v. J.P. Stevens & Co.,
538 F.2d 1152, 1160 (5th Cir. 1976) (applying a clear and convincing standard to plaintiff
requesting an adjudication of civil contempt); see also infra Part II.C.
117. 441 U.S. 418.
118. Id. at 419-22.
119. Id. at 423 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 423-24.
122. Id. at 423.
123. Id.
124. Id. at423-24.
125. Id. at 424.
126. Id.
127. Id. (citing cases that applied a clear and convincing standard when deportation and
denaturalization were involved).
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2. Presumptions
A "presumption" is a legal inference that one fact is true given that
another known fact is true. 128 A presumption shifts the burden of proof to
the opposing party who then must overcome the presumption to prove that
the inferred fact is not true. 129 A "rebuttable presumption" establishes a
prima facie case that the fact is true but can be overcome by contrary
evidence. 130
In 1974, Federal Rule of Evidence 301 was enacted to define the effect of
presumptions in federal actions. 131 The rule provides,
In all civil actions.., a presumption imposes on the party against whom
it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet
the presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in
the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial
upon the party on whom it was originally cast.132
Before the rule was enacted, two conflicting views of presumptions existed.
One view, referred to as the Thayer theory, 133 viewed presumptions as a
procedural device that shifted the burden of producing evidence to the party
against whom the presumption is directed. 134 The other view, referred to as
the Morgan theory, 135 believed a presumption shifted both the burden of
production of evidence and the burden of persuasion. 136 Today, the general
consensus is that Federal Rule of Evidence 301 adopted Thayer's approach
to presumptions.137
A patent's presumption of validity can be analogized to a tennis
match.138 As Charles Phipps explains, § 282 of the Patent Act "determines
who will serve first, but does not regulate the height of the net."' 39 The
height of the net, and thereby the difficulty for the party challenging the
patent "to hit the ball over the net and place the ball in the patentee's court,"
128. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 91, at 1304.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1306.
131. FED. R. EVID. 301.
132. Id.
133. See JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE
COMMON LAW 336-39 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1898). Professor Wigmore also
supported this approach and thus it was sometimes called the Thayer-Wigmore theory. JoHN
HENRY WIGMORE, SELECT CASES ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 745, at 1068-71 (2d ed. 1913).
134. See generally 2 JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 344(A), at
445-46 (5th ed. 1999).
135. Charles McCormick also supported this approach and thus it is sometimes called the
Morgan-McCormick theory. CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 316, at 667-68
(1954).
136. Edmund M. Morgan, Foreword to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 1, 52-65 (1942). For
more discussion of the two approaches, see generally 21B WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note
99, § 5122.1, at 425-43.
137. See Reeves v. Gen. Foods Corp., 682 F.2d 515, 522 n.10 (5th Cir. 1982).
138. See Charles E.:Phipps, The Presumption ofAdministrative Correctness: The Proper
Basis for the Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard, 10 FED. CIR. B.J. 143, 148 (2001).
139. Id.
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is regulated by the weight of the evidentiary burden. 140 The clear and
convincing standard "set[s] [the net] in the high position," making it more
difficult for the challenger to pass the ball.141 The next section of this Note
will discuss general administrative law principles and specifically how they
apply to patent-related issues.
C. Administrative Law
Administrative law governs agencies-"governmental bod[ies] with the
authority to implement and administer particular legislation."'142  The
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) was enacted in 1946 and governs
agency procedures and judicial review of agency decisions. 143 Courts can
review administrative agency actions, and this review is important because
it provides relief to individuals, "foster[s] reasoned decisionmaking," and
ensures that agencies act according to political will. 144 Judicial review is
not always available, but when it is, the "scope of review" allowed by the
court becomes an issue. 145
The PTO is a federal agency in the Department of Commerce. 146
However, both the Federal Circuit and commentators have at times been
"inattentive" to administrative law's role in the patent law. 147 For example,
the Federal Circuit has held that the APA did not alter the applicable
standard for reviewing PTO findings of fact. 148 The Supreme Court,
however, reversed the Federal Circuit's decision and held that the APA
does apply to the PTO and that the court must review PTO decisions within
its framework. 149 Thus, the Supreme Court has indicated that as an
administrative agency, the PTO is generally subject to the principles of
administrative law. 150 Most of the PTO's decisions, like those of any
administrative agency, are in reality a series of conclusions. 151 These
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 91, at 71.
143. See Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1954) (codified
at 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-706 (2006)).
144. ERNEST GELLHORN & RONALD M. LEVIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS IN A
NUTSHELL 72 (5th ed. 2006).
145. Id. at 73.
146. 15 U.S.C. § 1511(4) (2006).
147. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who's Afraid of the APA? What the
Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 270 (2007) ("[T]he
inattention to administrative law principles has long been a striking feature of the patent
system. In contrast to commentators and practitioners in other technically complex areas...
the patent law community has tended to pay little attention to administrative law.").
148. In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1998), rev'd sub nom. Dickinson v.
Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999).
149. Dickinson, 527 U.S. at 152.
150. See id.; see also Benjamin & Rai, supra note 147, at 270 (explaining that patent
reform legislation with "emphasis on fortifying administrative procedures ... is in accord
with the Supreme Court's interest, demonstrated through its 1999 Dickinson v. Zurko
decision, in applying administrative law to the patent system").
151. GELLHORN & LEVIN, supra note 144, at 74.
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conclusions usually fall into one of three categories: legal, factual, or
political. 152
.1. Legal Determinations
Administrative law governs the effect that an administrative agency's
legal determinations have on subsequent judicial proceedings. In the early
case of Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 15 3 the Court was faced with the
Administrator of the Fair Labor Standards Act's interpretation of the Fair
Labor Standards Act.1 54 Under this statute, the courts had the responsibility
of deciding cases. 15   Thus, the Court explained, the Administrator's
findings were not binding upon the Court. 156 However, despite the fact that
the findings had not resulted from an adversarial proceeding, the findings
were "entitled to respect" in courts. 157 According to the Court, the weight
given to a finding would "depend on the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and
later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade,
if lacking power to control."' 158 Thus, while an agency's interpretations
cannot have the force of law, they are still entitled to "respect" from the
courts to the extent that they have "power to persuade." 159
Some agency legal determinations are entitled to a higher level of
deference by courts, and in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.,160 the Supreme Court decided what effect these
determinations have. 161 The case involved the Environmental Protection
Agency's construction of the term "stationary" as it was used in the Clean
Air Act.162 In determining the level of deference to afford the EPA's
construction of the term "stationary," the Court explained that when it
reviews an agency's statutory construction, the first inquiry is "whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue." 163  If
congressional intent is clear, both the courts and the agency must obey that
intent. 164 However, if a statute is "silent or ambiguous" a court must
determine whether the agency's conclusion was "based on a permissible
152. See id. at 74-75 ("Typically, an agency interprets the law it is supposed to
implement; itfindsfacts about the situation it will address; and it uses discretion in applying
the law to the factual situation that it has found to exist."); see also Benjamin & Rai, supra
note 147, at 284 (explaining that agency determinations are broken down into three
categories: fact, law, and policy).
153. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
154. Id. at 137-38.
155. Id. at 137.
156. Id. at 139.
157. Id. at 140.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
161. Id. at 842-45.
162. Id. at 840.
163. Id. at 842.
164. Id. at 842-43.
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construction" or, as the Court also phrased it, a "reasonable interpretation"
of the statute. 165 Thus, if congressional intent is clear, a court will not defer
to an agency's interpretation of a statute, but when a statute is not clear, a
court will defer to the agency's interpretation if it is reasonable. 166
More recently, in Christensen v. Harris County,167 the Supreme Court
held that an agency's statutory interpretation in an opinion letter did not
merit deference. 168  The Court held that other agency interpretations,
namely those "contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and
enforcement guidelines" also did not "warrant Chevron-style deference"
because they "lack the force of law."' 169 The Court did state that such
interpretations were "entitled to respect," but only because they have
"power to persuade."' 70
The Court expanded on the idea expressed in Christensen in United
States v. Mead Corp.,171 where the Court had to decide how much
deference was due to the U.S. Custom Service's tariff classification
ruling. 172 The Court explained that whether an interpretation was due
Skidmore or Chevron deference depended on whether "Congress would
expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law."'173 The Court
went further to explain that it is "fair to assume" Congress had this
expectation when the interpretation is the result of "a relatively formal
administrative procedure tending to foster . . . fairness and deliberation."' 1
74
Thus, after Mead, a court must decide whether the agency interpretation at
issue was the result of a procedure that Congress would expect to yield
results with the force of law; if so, that interpretation is entitled to Chevron,
rather than Skidmore, deference. 175
The question of a court's deference to an administrative agency's legal
interpretations is implicated in cases involving patents. 176 When the PTO
issues a patent, it makes legal interpretations by applying legal standards to
underlying factual findings. 177 For example, whether patented subject
165. Id. at 843-44.
166. See id. at 842-44.
167. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
168. Id. at 587.
169. Id.
170. Id. (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
171. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
172. Id. at221.
173. Id. at 229.
174. Id. at 230.
175. See id. at 229-30. See generally GELLHORN & LEVIN, supra note 144, at 79-102
(discussing courts' deference to agency legal findings and exceptions to the Chevron
doctrine).
176. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 147, at 297-301 (discussing the role of
administrative law in assessing the PTO's legal interpretations).
177. See id. at 297 ("Legal interpretation most often comes into play because patent
validity determinations such as nonobviousness require the application of legal standards to
underlying factual findings.").
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matter is obvious is a legal conclusion based on factual findings. 178
Ultimately, the Supreme Court has recognized that "[a] patent ... simply
represents a legal conclusion reached by the Patent Office." 179 According
to the Supreme Court, Chevron deference applies both to an agency's pure
legal interpretations and to legal interpretations made in the course of
applying legal standards to facts.180 However, Mead teaches that whether
the PTO's proceedings are "formal" determines whether the interpretations
warrant Chevron, as opposed to Skidmore, deference. 181  The PTO's
rulemaking authority covers many procedural and a few substantive
issues. 182 The statutes pertaining to the PTO, however, have no general
grant of rulemaking authority and the PTO does not have the power to
decide requirements for patentability' 83 The Court in Mead did indicate
that agency decisions with the "force of law" were entitled to Chevron
deference. 184 The PTO's decision to issue a patent is legally binding.' 85
Thus, whether the PTO is entitled to Chevron or Skidmore deference when
it makes legal interpretations depends on whether its proceedings qualify as
formal adjudications or its decisions have the force of law, as required by
Mead.186
2. Factual Findings
The APA sets out a process for federal court review of an administrative
agency's factual decisions.187 The statute specifically enunciates three
standards of review that can apply:
The reviewing court shall-
178. Aktiebolaget Karlstads Mekaniska Werkstad v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 705 F.2d
1565, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
179. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969).
180. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446-48 (1987) (applying Chevron
deference where an agency applied legal standards to facts); see also Benjamin & Rai, supra
note 147, at 297 (asserting that Chevron deference applies to an agency's application of legal
standards to facts and that United States v. Mead Corp. does not suggest a different test).
181. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228-30 (2001); see also supra notes
171-75 and accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 132(b) (2006) (enabling the Director to "prescribe regulations"
providing for continued examination of patent applications). The broadest authority given to
the PTO is its ability to regulate with respect to "proceedings in the Office." Id. § 2(b)(2)(A).
This authority, however, is still "fairly narrow" because it pertains only to the PTO's internal
procedures. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 147, at 298 n.149.
183. See Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that
the PTO's broadest rulemaking power allows it to regulate proceedings within the PTO, but
"does NOT grant the Commissioner the authority to issue substantive rules"). The court has
reasoned that because the PTO does not have broad rulemaking authority, a "Final
Determination" issued by the PTO does not have the "force and effect of law." Id. at 1550.
184. Mead, 533 U.S. at 229.
185. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 147, at 298 (explaining that the PTO issues legally
binding patents "via informal adjudication").
186. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 229-30; see also supra notes 171-75 and accompanying text.
187. Administrative Procedure Act of 1954, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-706 (2006).
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(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to
sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record
of an agency hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject
to trial de novo by the reviewing court. 188
The "substantial evidence" test is used if the agency decision was made
"after a trial-type, on-the-record hearing (a 'formal adjudication' or
'rulemaking on a record'). ' 189 In most other cases, the court will apply the
"arbitrary and capricious" test, though the court has applied the de novo
standard in a few cases. 19 0
Despite the Federal Circuit's reluctance to apply the APA to review PTO
decisions, the Supreme Court ruled in Dickinson v. Zurko191 that the APA
does in fact apply to review of PTO fact-finding. 192 The Court overturned
the Federal Circuit's use of a "clearly erroneous" standard of review and
held that the court must apply one of the standards set out in the APA. 19 3
The issue of which standard applies arose at oral argument, and Justice
Breyer suggested that the arbitrary and capricious standard should apply
because of the nature of PTO proceedings.194 However, the Court in Zurko
was not presented with the specific question of what standard of review
applies when courts review PTO factual determinations and thus did not
resolve the issue. 195
After the Supreme Court decided Zurko, In re Gartside196 presented the
Federal Circuit with the question of which APA standard of review applied
to review of PTO factual determinations. 197  The court reviewed
§ 706(2)(E) of the APA, which provides for "substantial evidence" review
when the "case [is] subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise
188. Id. § 706(2).
189. GELLHORN & LEVIN, supra note 144, at 98.
190. Id.
191. 527 U.S. 150 (1999).
192. Id. at 152.
193. Id. at 152-53.
194. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (No. 98-377),
1999 WL 190969, at *4--8 (arguing that the arbitrary and capricious standard "applies to all
determinations... of fact that are not based on a closed record"); see also Benjamin & Rai,
supra note 147, at 287 (asserting that Justice Breyer suggested that the arbitrary and
capricious standard would apply because PTO proceeding are "ex parte" and "informal").
195. See Zurko, 527 U.S. at 152 (deciding whether the APA applies to judicial review of
PTO decisions); see also Benjamin & Rai, supra note 147, at 287.
196. 203 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
197. Id. at 1312.
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reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute."1 98 The
court admitted that PTO proceedings do not meet the first criteria-that is,
it was not under §§ 556 and 557 of the APA. 199 The court did hold that the
PTO proceedings fell under the second part of § 706(2)(E)-that is, they are
"reviewed on the record. '200 The court came to this conclusion because the
court is statutorily required to "review Board decisions 'on the record"'
developed by the PTO.20 1  Thus, the court concluded that PTO factual
determinations should be reviewed for "substantial evidence" under
§ 706(2)(E) of the APA.20 2
3. Policy Determinations
The APA does not include a specific standard for courts to apply to
administrative agency policy, also called discretionary, decisions.20 3 In the
absence of a statutory standard, courts have applied the "arbitrary or
capricious" standard of review to an agency's policy decisions.20 4 When
applying this standard, courts take a hard look at the agency's
determination. 20 5  The "hard look," also known as the "reasoned
decisionmaking" standard, is widely applied by courts reviewing agency
policy decisions. 20 6
Judicial review of discretionary decisions is deferential, but has more
"bite" than review of factual or legal determinations.207 Hard look review
should apply to review of the PTO because the PTO, as the Federal Circuit
has recognized, does exercise discretion. 20 8  The court, however, has
generally not applied hard look review to PTO policy decisions and has
even "failed to recognize policy decisions as a separate category of PTO
behavior." 20 9
198. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2006); see In re Gartside, 203 F.3d at 1313 (reviewing
§ 706(2)(E)).
199. In re Gartside, 203 F.3d at 1313 (explaining that § 554 excludes PTO adjudication
from §§ 556 and 557).
200. Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1994)).
201. Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 144 (1994)); see also id. ("'The United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall review the decision from which an appeal is taken on
the record before the Patent and Trademark Office."' (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 144)).
202. Id. For more discussion of the Federal Circuit's treatment of review of PTO fact-
finding, see Benjamin & Rai, supra note 147, at 285-93.
203. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006); see also Benjamin & Rai, supra note 147, at 304
("Section 706(2)(A) does not include a distinct provision for review of 'policy."').
204. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-
43 (1983).
205. See id.
206. GELLHORN & LEVIN, supra note 144, at 104.
207. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 147, at 305 (asserting that in the context of "ordinary"
administrative law, "of the three forms of review, hard look review has proved to have the
most bite").
208. See, e.g., Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(applying the arbitrary and capricious standard).
209. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 147, at 305. Two commentators have explained that
although the Federal Circuit has cited to and applied Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v.
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When the PTO examines a patent application, it makes several
underlying determinations as well as an ultimate determination of
patentability.210 The PTO makes factual, legal, and discretionary decisions
and as an administrative agency is generally subject to the APA. Thus,
when a court is reviewing a PTO decision, the level of deference due to the
PTO's decisions is an important issue. This deference forms at least part of
the debate over the applicable burden of proof explained in Part II.
II. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF
Part II addresses the historical conflict regarding approaches to the
burden of proof required to overcome a patent's presumption of validity
among the multiple levels of courts hearing patent litigation-the courts of
appeals, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the Federal Circuit, and
the Supreme Court. A survey of the courts' approaches to the burden over
time shows its changing course. This part also presents the arguments
supporting the various burdens. Although the Federal Circuit has uniformly
applied a heightened burden, recent language from the Supreme Court gives
reason to question if that burden is proper.
Specifically, Part II.A examines the various circuit courts of appeals and
their conflicting application of either the clear and convincing standard,
discussed in Part II.A.1, or the preponderance of the evidence standard,
discussed in Part II.A.2, to overcome a patent's presumption of validity.
Part II.A.3 discusses the standard of proof required when the PTO did not
consider prior art that is asserted in litigation in support of invalidity. Part
II.B discusses relevant Court of Customs and Patent Appeals case law. Part
II.C discusses Federal Circuit precedent. Finally, Part II.D reviews
Supreme Court decisions addressing the burden of proof required to
overcome the presumption of validity.
A. Pre-Federal Circuit Case Law in the Circuit Courts of Appeals
Before the establishment of the Federal Circuit in 1982, the various
courts of appeals differed in what standard of proof they required to rebut
the presumption of patent validity. 211 Some circuits required clear and
convincing evidence regardless of claimed grounds for invalidity. 212
State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. when reviewing administrative agencies' policy
decisions, it rarely cites the case when reviewing PTO decisions. Id. at 305-06 n. 192.
210. See supra Part I.A.1.
211. Compare Dickstein v. Seventy Corp., 522 F.2d 1294, 1297 (6th Cir. 1975) (adopting
a preponderance of the evidence standard), and Rains v. Niaqua, Inc., 406 F.2d 275, 278 (2d
Cir. 1969) (applying a preponderance of the evidence standard), with Hobbs v. U.S. Atomic
Energy Comm'n, 451 F.2d 849, 856 (5th Cir. 1971) (applying a clear and convincing
evidence standard), and Universal Marion Corp. v. Warner & Swasey Co., 354 F.2d 541,
544 (10th Cir. 1965) (same).
212. See, e.g., Hobbs, 451 F.2d at 856 ("[T]he presumption of patent validity may be
rebutted only by a quantum of proof-whether it be called clear and convincing or beyond a
reasonable doubt-which is greater than a mere preponderance of the evidence."); Universal
Marion Corp., 354 F.2d at 544 ("[A] party asserting invalidity on the ground of anticipation
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Although the courts of appeals no longer hear appeals in patent cases, the
precedent from before the formation of the Federal Circuit is important in
order to understand the developments surrounding the required burden of
proof. This Note argues in Part III that this precedent also should have
informed the Federal Circuit's later decisions regarding the issue, especially
considering that the circuit courts of appeals applied different burdens of
proof.
Part II.A.1 describes the application of the clear and convincing burden
of proof in the courts of appeals and discusses commentators' support for
the heightened standard. Part II.A.2 explains the adoption of the
preponderance of the evidence standard in multiple courts of appeals and
discusses commentators' views on the standard. Finally, Part II.A.3
discusses an exception to the conflict among the circuit courts, namely the
uniform application of a preponderance of the evidence standard when
evidence asserted at trial was not considered by the PTO.
1. Clear and Convincing Evidence
a. The Circuit Courts
In some circumstances, the court was explicit in requiring a heightened
burden of proof, but did not explain its adoption of the standard. In a U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit case, Moon v. Cabot Shops, Inc.,213
the plaintiffs sued for infringement of their patent covering a portable
derrick for drilling oil wells.214 The defendants affirmatively pleaded that
the patent was invalid because it was not novel and was obvious in view of
the prior art.215 Additionally, the defendants asserted that the patent was
invalid on the grounds of prior publication. 216 The district court held that
the patent was valid because it was an inventive advance over the prior art
and was not patented or published more than one year prior to the filing of
the patent application.217 The Ninth Circuit noted the presumption of
validity of an issued patent and explained that the presumption is founded
"upon the expertness of the Patent Office acting within its specific field. ' 218
The court went further and, without explication, stated that the presumption
of validity "can be overcome only by clear and convincing proof. '219 The
court then upheld the district court's conclusion that the patent was valid.220
in the prior art, or for any other reason, has the burden of establishing such invalidity by
clear and convincing evidence."); see also infra Part II.A. L.a.
213. 270 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1959).
214. Id. at 540.
215. Id. at 541.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 542.
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Other circuits were less clear about the exact quantum of evidence
necessary to overcome the presumption of validity. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, for example, faced the question in Hobbs v.
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.2 21 In this case, the plaintiff sued the U.S.
Atomic Energy Commission (the Commission) seeking compensation for
its alleged unlawful taking of his patent rights.222 Hobbs had invented two
valves-the G valve and the H valve-instrumental in the production of
nuclear weapons. 223 Hobbs subsequently filed and obtained patents on both
valves.224  Hobbs then submitted a request for compensation for the
government's taking and use of his patented invention.225  The
Commission's Patent Compensation Board denied compensation and the
Commission refused review.226 Hobbs appealed and the Fifth Circuit had
to decide whether his patents were valid.227
Before deciding the merits of the case, the court outlined the applicable
law of patentability and the presumption of patent validity.22 8 It explained
that the Fifth Circuit had "employed varying statements of the necessary
quantum of proof' to rebut the presumption of patent validity. 229 The court
did not resolve the inconsistency within the circuit, but "state[d] that the
presumption of patent validity may be rebutted only by a quantum of
proof-whether it be called clear and convincing or beyond a reasonable
doubt-which is greater than a mere preponderance of the evidence."
230
The court went on to find the G valve patent invalid because of "clear and
convincing evidence" that it was on sale more than one year before Hobbs
filed the patent application. 231 With respect to the H valve, the court did
not find the quantum of evidence necessary to rebut the presumption of
validity by reason of the "on sale" bar, the "in public use" defense, the
"sole-inventorship defense," or in view of prior art.232
Many courts simply applied a heightened burden of proof with little or no
explanation. 233  The courts were not always clear about whether the
221. 451 F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1971).
222. Id. at 852.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 852-53.
225. Id. at 853.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 855.
228. Id. at 855-56.
229. Id. at 856 (citations omitted) (listing cases requiring everything from "competent
evidence" to evidence "beyond a reasonable doubt").
230. Id.
231. Id. at 860.
232. Id. at 860-66.
233. See, e.g., Trio Process Corp. v. L. Goldstein's Sons, Inc., 461 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir.
1972) ("Indeed, invalidity must be demonstrated by clear and convincing proof .... (citing
Ever-Wear, Inc. v. Wieboldt Stores, Inc., 427 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1970); Gen. Foods Corp. v.
Perk Foods Co., 419 F.2d 944 (7th Cir. 1969); Moon v. Cabot Shops, Inc., 270 F.2d 539 (9th
Cir. 1959))); Ever-Wear, Inc., 427 F.2d at 375; King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Refrigerated
Dispensers, Inc., 354 F.2d 533, 536 (10th Cir. 1965) (citing cases and characterizing the fact
that the burden of proof is clear and convincing evidence as "elementary patent law").
2010] 2637
FORDHAMLA W REVIEW
heightened burden applied when certain grounds for invalidity were
asserted or in all cases regardless of the grounds asserted. 234 On the other
hand, some courts explicitly stated that the heightened burden applies
regardless of the grounds asserted for invalidity.235 However, even when a
circuit did not make explicit whether its heightened burden requirement was
restricted to the facts of the case, later cases applied the heightened burden
to other grounds of invalidity. 236
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit expressed the burden of
proof differently than the other circuits that required a heightened
burden. 237 The Eighth Circuit called the quantum of proof necessary to
overcome the presumption of validity "substantial evidence. '238 In L & A
Products, Inc. v. Britt Tech Corp.,239 the court specifically applied the
substantial evidence standard to any ground asserted for invalidity.240 In
another case dealing with the presumption, the defendants argued that the
district court erred when it required that the plaintiff overcome the
presumption of the patent's validity with substantial evidence. 241  The
defendants claimed that the substantial evidence standard was too lenient
and that the court should have required clear and convincing evidence like
other circuits required. 242 The court, however, agreed with the district
court's use of the substantial evidence standard because it was the quantum
of proof required in the circuit.243 The court noted that both the substantial
evidence and the clear and convincing evidence standard were "heavy
burdens of proof. '244 The court also had "no doubt" that the evidence of
prior sale in the case that was sufficient under the substantial evidence
standard would also have satisfied a clear and convincing evidence
standard.245 Although the Eighth Circuit formulated the standard of proof
234. See, e.g., Trio Process Corp., 461 F.2d at 70 (discussing the presumption of patent
validity separately from the grounds asserted for invalidity in the case).
235. See, e.g., Universal Marion Corp. v. Warner & Swasey Co., 354 F.2d 541, 544 (10th
Cir. 1965) ("[A] party asserting invalidity on the ground of anticipation in the prior art, or for
any other reason, has the burden of establishing such invalidity by clear and convincing
evidence.").
236. See, e.g., Paeco, Inc. v. Applied Moldings, Inc., 562 F.2d 870, 872-78 (3d Cir. 1977)
(citing Trio Process Corp. v. L. Goldstein's Sons, Inc., which applied a heightened burden
when invalidity was asserted on grounds of obviousness, as support for applying a
heightened burden when the grounds asserted for invalidity were prior public use or sale,
anticipation, and lack of novelty).
237. Compare L & A Prods., Inc. v. Britt Tech Corp., 365 F.2d 83, 86 (8th Cir. 1966)(requiring "substantial evidence" to rebut the presumption of validity), with Moon v. Cabot
Shops, Inc., 270 F.2d 539, 541 (9th Cir. 1959) (requiring "clear and convincing proof' to
overcome the presumption of validity).
238. See, e.g., L & A Prods., 365 F.2d at 86.
239. 365 F.2d 83.
240. Id. at 86 ("[The] presumption is rebuttable and may be overcome by substantial
evidence negating any one of the three essentials for patentability.").
241. Clark Equip. Co. v. Keller, 570 F.2d 778, 794 (8th Cir. 1978).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 795-96.
244. Id. at 795 n. 17.
245. Id.
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required to rebut a patent's presumption of validity as substantial
evidence-not specifically clear and convincing evidence-the circuit
applied the standard regardless of the grounds asserted and characterized
the standard as heavy.246
b. Commentators
The American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA)
established a special committee to study the FTC report on patent reform
and write a report in response. 247 The AIPLA directly opposed the FTC's
recommendation to reduce the burden of proof for overcoming the
presumption of validity to a preponderance of the evidence. 248 Specifically,
the AIPLA argued that changing the burden would "undermine decades of
well-reasoned precedent. '249  The report characterized the heightened
burden as "entirely appropriate" and asserted that the standard is not unduly
burdensome on the party alleging invalidity of a patent.
250
The AIPLA argues that the FTC "misunderstood the scope and motive"
of the heightened standard and attributed this misunderstanding to the
imprecise nature of many court decisions.251  The report clarifies the
confusion by explaining that "well-reasoned precedent" requires that the
facts supporting a validity challenge be proven by clear and convincing
evidence but that the heightened burden is, but should not be, applied to the
ultimate conclusion of invalidity.252 In support of its position, the report
argued that many courts applied a heightened burden before the creation of
the Federal Circuit. 253 According to the AIPLA, the courts' rules were
grounded in three sources: the presumption of validity under statutory law
and common law, the reliability of evidence, and the court's deference to
the PTO. 25 4  Ultimately, the AIPLA asserted that "(1) the existence,
authentication, availability and scope of evidence should be established by
clear and convincing evidence, but (2) once such predicate facts are so
established, the burden should be that the persuasive force of such facts
demonstrates patent invalidity by a fair preponderance, not some elevated
standard." 255
One commentator argues that § 282 is not the proper basis for the
heightened burden of proof, but that the standard is justified nonetheless.256
246. See id.
247. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW Ass'N, AIPLA RESPONSE TO THE OCTOBER 2003
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION REPORT, at i (2004). For discussion of the FTC's report, see
infra Part II.A.2.b.
248. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS'N, supra note 247, at 6.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 6-7.
253. Id. at 8.
254. Id. at 8-13.
255. Id. at 16.
256. Phipps, supra note 138, at 143.
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The correct basis, he asserts, is the "presumption of administrative
correctness." 257  In his article, Charles E. Phipps explains that the
presumption of patent validity is a legal presumption that does not address
the evidentiary burden of proof and is also a procedural device that places
the burden of proof on the party asserting invalidity. 258
Phipps explains that the PTO is "staffed by expert and experienced
personnel uniquely qualified to determine questions of patentability. '259 He
admits, however, that the PTO does not make findings with respect to all
issues dispositive of patent validity and argues that the presumption of
administrative correctness should not apply to those issues.260 When there
is no presumption of administrative correctness, Phipps asserts that there is
no longer a rationale for requiring clear and convincing evidence to rebut
the presumption of patent validity. 261  Phipps further argues that the
presumption of administrative correctness should attach to those issues the
PTO does determine. 262  When the presumption of administrative
correctness does attach, Phipps asserts that the clear and convincing
evidence standard is justified.263 He also argues that the presumption of
administrative correctness is "obviated" when prior art was not considered
by the PTO, and, thus, the proper evidentiary standard is a preponderance of
the evidence. 264  Ultimately, Phipps asserts that the presumption of
administrative correctness is the proper basis for the presumption of patent
validity and that the heightened evidentiary burden is proper when the
presumption attaches, but that a lower burden should be required when the
presumption does not attach.265
2. A Preponderance of the Evidence
a. The Circuit Courts
In direct conflict with the circuits that required clear and convincing
evidence, some courts required a lesser burden-a preponderance of the
evidence-to overcome a patent's presumption of validity. In a case before
the U.S Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Rains v. Niaqua, Inc.,2 6 6
the plaintiff appealed the district court's decision that the plaintiffs design
257. Id.
258. See id. at 145-48.
259. Id. at 149.
260. See id. at 149-50. The issues to which the presumption of administrative correctness
does not apply, according to Phipps, are the best mode disclosure requirement, the "regards
as his invention" requirement, and designation of inventorship. See id. at 156-57, 162.
261. See id. at 152.
262. See id. at 154-57 (explaining that the presumption of administrative correctness
applies to the issues of utility, novelty, nonobviousness, written description, enablement, and
definiteness).
263. See id. at 162.
264. See id. at 160.
265. See id. at 162.
266. 406 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1969).
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patent for an above-ground pool was obvious in view of the prior art.267
The plaintiff argued that the prior-art evidence alone could not overcome
the statutory presumption of validity and that the presumption should
prevail because the defendant did not introduce expert testimony on the
obviousness of the design.2 68 The Second Circuit rejected this reasoning,
explaining that the presumption does not have any independent evidentiary
value.269 The court then explained that "a preponderance of the evidence
determines the issue" of patent validity. 270 Ultimately, the court held that
the district court had not erred in concluding that the design patent was
obvious in light of prior art.271  The court thus required only a
preponderance of the evidence to overcome the presumption of validity,
even when prior art was asserted as the grounds of invalidity.272
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit also applied a
preponderance of the evidence standard, specifically rejecting a heightened
burden of proof. In Universal Inc. v. Kay Manufacturing Corp.,273 the
plaintiff sued for the infringement of his patent covering wire springs for
upholstered seats.274 The defendant argued noninfringement based on the
contention that the structure of the defendant's product did not accomplish
the basic purpose of the patent.275  The Fourth Circuit rejected this
argument and found that the defendant had infringed the patent.276 Next,
the court turned to the defense that the patent was invalid because of
disclosures in prior art.277 The court specifically rejected the plaintiffs
contention that the defendant must prove invalidity beyond a reasonable
doubt.278 The court explained that the cases the plaintiff cited in support of
a heightened burden were cases in which the issue was priority of
discovery, which, according to the court, are distinguishable from the case
at hand, which involved prior-art disclosures. 279 The court then concluded
that the patent was correctly held to be valid.280 Thus, the court did not
apply a heightened burden of proof, even where prior art was asserted as the
grounds for invalidity.281
In a case before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
Campbell v. Spectrum Automation Co.,282 the defendant counterclaimed
267. Id. at 275,278.
268. Id. at 278.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 280.
272. Id. at 278.
273. 301 F,2d 140 (4thCir. 1962).
274. Id. at 141.
275. Id. at 143-44.
276. Id. at 146.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 148.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. 513 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1975).
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alleging that the patent at issue was invalid because the plaintiff was not the
true inventor.283 In the counterclaim, the defendant alleged that he was the
true inventor.284 Each party gave oral testimony in support of his position,
and neither had strong corroborating evidence. 285  After surveying
precedent, the Sixth Circuit concluded that clear and convincing evidence
was required to overcome the presumption of patent validity. 286 However,
the court did not "commit this Circuit to any general rule requiring the
application of this standard in all patent cases. '287 The court also noted that
the clear and convincing standard arose from early decisions that were
concerned about accepting parol evidence to prove facts better proven by
documentary evidence. 288
The application of a heightened burden in Campbell did not turn into the
rule in the Sixth Circuit, however. The court encountered another validity
issue in Dickstein v. Seventy Corp.289 Here, the defendants counterclaimed
for a declaratory judgment of invalidity. 290 The district court required clear
and convincing evidence of invalidity and rejected the defendant's claim
that the patent was invalid as obvious.291 On appeal, the court noted that
the clear and convincing standard was applied in Campbell, but explained
that the holding in Campbell was limited to its facts.292 The court reasoned
that certain "unusual factual circumstances" justify application of a heavy
burden.293 The court explained that the present case did not involve the
concern for unreliability and concluded that in the "usual patent case.. . . a
preponderance of the evidence is sufficient to establish invalidity."2 94, Here,
the court applied a lower burden of proof when the defendant asserted
obviousness as the grounds for proving invalidity and held that the lower
burden applied in the "usual" case.295
b. Commentators
In 2003, the FTC published a report making recommendations for patent
system reform in order to "maintain a proper balance with competition law
and policy."2 96 The recommendations were the result of twenty-four days
283. Id. at 933.
284. Id. at 934.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 935-37.
287. Id. at 937.
288. Id. at 936.
289. 522 F.2d 1294 (6th Cir. 1975).
290. Id. at 1295.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1296 (explaining that where oral testimony is offered to prove that the patent
holder is not the true inventor or to establish prior public use, or where fraudulent conduct is
asserted, a heavy burden is justified).
294. Id. at 1297.
295. Id. at 1295, 1297.
296. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 8, Executive Summary at 1.
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of hearings held by the FTC and the Department of Justice involving more
than three hundred panelists and over one hundred written submissions.297
The second recommendation the report made was to change the burden
of proof to show the invalidity of a patent to a preponderance of the
evidence. 298 The FTC asserted that the standard of proof should be lowered
because a "plethora" of circumstances favor a patent's issuance and because
the PTO does not have the resources to examine all patent applications
thoroughly. 299 The report explained that three thousand patent examiners
are tasked with evaluating patent applications that are filed with the PTO at
a rate of over one thousand per workday. 300 According to the hearings
upon which the report was based, examiners spent between eight and
twenty-five hours evaluating and making decisions pertaining to each
application. 301
The report also argued that procedures favor the issuance of patents, and
thus requiring a heightened burden to prove invalidity is "unjustified. '30 2
The most important factor, the FTC asserts, is that the courts have required
the PTO to presume that a patent application deserves to be granted, unless
the PTO can prove that the application does not meet some requirement for
patentability. 303  Multiple rules guiding the examination of patent
applications favor patentability. 30 4 The PTO does not, for example, inquire
into whether the applicant has met his duty of disclosure, and, thus, the
examiner's search for prior art is guided by only what the applicant
discloses. 30 5 In addition, an application is presumed to be nonobvious and
the burden is on the examiner to show obviousness. 306  A similar
presumption of patentability exists with respect to utility and written
297. See id. Executive Summary at 3-4.
298. See id. Executive Summary at 8.
299. See id.
300. See id. Executive Summary at 9-10. The report stated that in 2003, approximately
300,000 applications were filed yearly, and the number was increasing at ten percent per
year. Id.
301. See id. Executive Summary at 10 (explaining that an examiner must "read and
understand each application, search for prior art, evaluate patentability, communicate with
the applicant, work out necessary revisions, and reach and write up conclusions" in those
eight to twenty-five hours).
302. See id. Executive Summary at 8.
303. See id. Executive Summary at 9.
304. See id.
305. See id. (explaining that the examiner's prior art search is a "focal point of the
examination process," and the search is assisted only by the applicants' disclosure); see also
id. Executive Summary at 9 n.28 ("The PTO's Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
(MPEP) states that the agency 'does not investigate' duty of disclosure issues and 'does
not... reject' applications on that basis." (quoting U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2010 (8th ed. 2008))).
306. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 305, § 2142 ("If.. . the examiner
does not produce a prima facie case [of obviousness], the applicant is under no obligation to
submit evidence of nonobviousness."); see also FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 8, ch. 5, at
9.
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description. 30 7 Lastly, the FTC argued that the PTO grants patents based on
only a preponderance of the evidence, and, accordingly, it is not "sensible
to treat an issued patent as though it had met some higher standard of
patentability" by requiring a heightened burden to overturn a patent's
validity. 30 8 Ultimately, the FTC recommended that the burden of proof
should be lowered to a preponderance of the evidence standard, asserting
that the currently applied heightened burden can "undermine the ability of
the court system to weed out questionable patents." 309
3. Caveat: When Prior Art Was Not Considered by the PTO
a. The Courts of Appeals
Before the creation of the Federal Circuit, the circuit courts confronted
patent cases where evidence asserted to prove invalidity was not considered
by the PTO examiner. 310  Although the courts of appeals disagreed
regarding the burden of proof in the usual case, they all agreed about the
burden in cases with evidence unconsidered by the PTO. 311 The courts
recognized that in these cases there was no agency determination
warranting a heavy burden of proof.312 For example, the Fifth Circuit
reasoned that the principles on which the presumption is founded-the
"experience and expertise" of the PTO and the fact that awarding a patent is
an administrative determination-"no longer exist" when the invalidity
claim is supported by evidence not considered by the PTO. 3 13 As a result,
the court held that the party asserting invalidity was no longer required to
"bear the heavy burden of establishing invalidity either 'beyond a
reasonable doubt' or 'by clear and convincing evidence."' 314  The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit echoed this reasoning and
required only a preponderance of the evidence to invalidate a patent where
307. See Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications Under the 35 U.S.C. 112 1,
"Written Description" Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1099, 1105 (Jan. 5, 2001) ("There is a
strong presumption that an adequate written description of the claimed invention is present
when the application is filed."); Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1098-99
(Jan. 5, 2001) ("Office personnel . . . must treat as true a statement of fact made by an
applicant in relation to an asserted utility, unless countervailing evidence can be provided
that shows that one of ordinary skill in the art would have a legitimate basis to doubt the
credibility of such a statement."); see also FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 8, Executive
Summary at 9.
308. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 8, Executive Summary at 10.
309. Id.
310. See, e.g., Baumstimler v. Rankin, 677 F.2d 1061, 1066 (5th Cir. 1982) (explaining
that the defendant offered "highly relevant prior art" at trial to prove invalidity that was not
considered by the PTO).
311. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 22, Microsoft Corp. v. z4 Techs., Inc., No. 07-
1243 (U.S. Mar. 31, 2008), 2008 WL 877886, at *22.
312. See, e.g., id. at 23, 2008 WL 877886, at *23.
313. Id. at 20-21, 2008 WL 877886, at *20-21 (quoting Baumstimler, 677 F.2d at 1066).
314. Id. at 21, 2008 WL 877886, at *21 (quoting Baumstimler, 677 F.2d at 1066).
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the PTO did not consider prior art.315 Some courts held that where the PTO
did not consider prior art, the presumption of validity no longer existed.316
Prior to the establishment of the Federal Circuit, all of the circuits had
either weakened or removed the presumption of validity in cases where
asserted prior art was not considered by the PTO examiner.317
b. Recent Arguments in Litigation
In z4 Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,318 the Federal Circuit heard
an appeal from a jury's finding that Microsoft had infringed z4's patents
and had failed to prove that the patents were invalid. 319 In the district court,
Microsoft alleged that z4's patents were invalid because of anticipation and
obviousness. 320  The court required that Microsoft prove the patent's
invalidity by clear and convincing evidence. 321 Based on this standard, the
court denied Microsoft's motion for a judgment as a matter of law that the
patents were invalid. 322 Ultimately, the jury found that Microsoft had not
proven by clear and convincing evidence that the patents were invalid and
determined that Microsoft willfully infringed the patents.323 Microsoft
moved for new trial on multiple grounds, one of which was that the court
erred when it did not allow a jury instruction communicating that the
burden of proving a patent invalid is "more easily carried" when the party
asserting invalidity grounds his claim on references not considered by the
PTO.324 The district court denied the motion for a new trial. 325
315. See Mfg. Research Corp. v. Graybar Elec. Co., 679 F.2d 1355, 1364 (1lth Cir.
1982).
316. See, e.g., Plastic Container Corp. v. Cont'l Plastics of Okla., Inc., 708 F.2d 1554,
1558 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding that the "court must make a fresh assessment of the patent's
validity" when prior art not considered by the PTO is offered); Turzillo v. P & Z
Mergentime, 532 F.2d 1393, 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("The statutory presumption of validity
does not apply to prior art not cited to the Patent Office, and even one prior art reference not
cited to the examiner overcomes the presumption."); Alcor Aviation, Inc. v. Radair, Inc., 527
F.2d 113, 115 (9th Cir. 1975) (explaining that the presumption "dissipates upon a showing
that the prior art was not brought to the attention of the patent examiner").
317. See Plastic Container Corp., 708 F.2d at 1558; Turzillo, 532 F.2d at 1399; Futorian
Mfg. Corp. v Dual Mfg. & Eng'g, Inc., 528 F.2d 941, 943 (1st Cir. 1976); Alcor Aviation,
Inc., 527 F.2d at 115; U.S. Expansion Bolt Co. v. Jordan Indus., Inc., 488 F.2d 566, 569 (3d
Cir. 1973); Ralston Purina Co. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 442 F.2d 389, 390 (8th Cir. 1971);
Eisele v. St. Amour, 423 F.2d 135, 138-39 (6th Cir. 1970); Formal Fashions, Inc. v. Braiman
Bows, Inc., 369 F.2d 536, 539 (2d Cir. 1966); Heyl & Patterson, Inc. v. McDowell Co., 317
F.2d 719, 722 (4th Cir. 1963); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 311, at 21-
22, 2008 WL 877886, at *21-22.
318. 507 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. dismissed, 128 S. Ct. 2107 (2008).
319. Id. at 1344.
320. z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft, Corp., No. 6:06-CV-142, 2006 WL 2401099, at *3
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 2006), affid, 507 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
321. Id.
322. Id. at *6.
323. Id. at *2.
324. Id. at* 12.
325. Id. at*19.
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On appeal, the Federal Circuit upheld the jury's verdict because it was
supported by substantial evidence. 326 For the same reason, the court upheld
the district court's denial of Microsoft's motion for a judgment as a matter
of law that the patent was invalid.327 When considering Microsoft's request
for a new trial, the court noted that it was .proper for the district court to
instruct the jury that the party asserting invalidity (Microsoft) had the
burden of proving invalidity by clear and convincing evidence. 328 The
court rejected Microsoft's argument that the district court erred in not
instructing the jury that the burden may be more easily carried when prior
art was not considered by the PTO. 329 The Federal Circuit agreed with the
lower court that such an instruction could convey that the burden of proof is
not heightened in such circumstances. 330 Thus, the court effectively stated
that even when prior art was not considered by the PTO, the burden of
proving invalidity is still clear and convincing evidence. 331
Microsoft appealed to the Supreme Court. 332 In the petition for a writ of
certiorari, Microsoft argued that the Supreme Court should answer the
question whether a court should require invalidity to be proven by clear and
convincing evidence when a defense of patent invalidity is predicated on
prior art not considered by the PTO. 333 Microsoft argued that the clear and
convincing standard should be reviewed because the Federal Circuit
ignored the Supreme Court's decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex,
Inc.334 The petition also alleged that the standard conflicted with the
regional circuits' decisions from before the Federal Circuit was formed. 335
Finally, Microsoft argued that the heightened standard was at odds with
principles of administrative law. 336 However, the Supreme Court did not
hear the issue because the parties settled the case before the Court could
rule on the petition. 337
A very similar situation arose recently in Lucent Technologies v.
Gateway, Inc.338 At trial, the defendant was charged with infringement and
326. z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 507 F.3d 1340, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
327. Id. at 1353.
328. Id. at 1354.
329. Id. at 1354-55.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 311.
333. Id. at i, 2008 WL 877886, at *i.
334. Id. at 15-19, 2008 WL 877886, at *15-19; see KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550
U.S. 398 (2007); see also infra Part II.D.
335. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 311, at 19-23, 2008 WL 877886, at * 19-
23; see also supra Part II.A.3.a.
336. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 311, at 23-26, 2008 WL 877886, at *23-
26, Microsoft Corp. v. z4 Techs., Inc., No. 07-1243 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 31, 2008), 2008 WL
877886.
337. See Settlement in Suit over Piracy Blocker, SEATTLE TIMES, May 13, 2008,
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/2004409635-bizbriefsl 3.html;
see also Microsoft Corp. v. z4 Techs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2107 (2008) (dismissing the petition
for a writ of certiorari).
338. 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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defended on the grounds of invalidity of the patent and noninfringement. 339
Microsoft, one of the defendants, alleged that the patent was invalid
because it was anticipated or obvious.340  After the jury found that
Microsoft infringed the patent, Microsoft filed a posttrial motion for
judgment as a matter of law that the patent was invalid, but the district court
upheld the jury verdict. 341  On appeal, Microsoft challenged only the
district court's decision with respect to the patent's obviousness. 342 The
Federal Circuit upheld the district court's decision because a jury could
have reasonably found that Microsoft had not proven the patent's invalidity
by clear and convincing evidence. 343
About a month after the Federal Circuit's decision, Microsoft filed a
petition for rehearing en banc with the Federal Circuit. 344 Microsoft
explained that the district court had denied its request for jury instructions
reciting a preponderance of the evidence standard to prove invalidity. 345
Microsoft further explained that it had argued on appeal that the district
court erred by giving jury instructions reciting the clear and convincing
standard.346 The Petition noted that the Federal Circuit did not discuss
which burden of proof should apply, even though both parties had briefed
the issue.347 The Petition requested that the Federal Circuit rehear the case
en bane and reverse its precedent applying a clear and convincing standard
to prove invalidity even when prior art was not considered by the PTO. 34 8
In support of its contention, Microsoft explained that the clear and
convincing standard is inappropriate because it conflicts with pre-Federal
Circuit decisions in every circuit, because there is no reason to defer to the
PTO when it did not consider prior art, and because the heightened standard
causes harm by allowing invalid patents to remain in force.349 The Federal
Circuit has not yet decided whether to reconsider the case en banc.350
B. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
Because the CCPA heard patent cases before the creation of the Federal
Circuit, its precedent was evolving with respect to the burden of proof
required to overcome the presumption of patent validity simultaneously
with the circuit courts. 351 The CCPA came to require clear and convincing
339. Id. at 1309.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 1310.
343. Id. at 1316.
344. Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., Nos. 2008-
1485, -1487, -1495 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 13, 2009), 2009 WL 3611609.
345. Id. at 2, 2009 WL 3611609, at *2.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 3, 2009 WL 3611609, at *3.
348. Id. at 4, 2009 WL 3611609, at *4.
349. See id. at 8-14, 2009 WL 3611609, at *8-14.
350. See id.
351. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
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evidence to overcome the presumption of validity, even when the claim of
invalidity is supported by evidence not considered by the PTO.352
In Astra-Sjuco, A.B. v. United States International Trade Commission,353
the court heard an appeal from an order of the International Trade
Commission (ITC). 354 The ITC had determined that the plaintiff had
infringed a patent by importing and selling thermometer sheath packages. 355
When dealing with the validity of the relevant patent, the court, without
explanation, adopted the clear and convincing standard.356 The court cited
another of its cases in support, 357 but this case dealt only with the allocation
of the burden of proof, not the quantum of evidence required to overcome
the presumption of patent validity. 358
In Solder Removal Co. v. U.S. International Trade Commission,359 the
court overruled an ITC administrative law judge's decision holding that the
presumption of validity "does not exist when the most pertinent prior art
was neither presented to nor considered by the [Patent and Trademark
Office]. '360  The court reasoned that the "statute does not make the
presumption applicable in some situations and not in others." 361 The court
specifically held that "the presumption of validity is never 'destroyed. , 362
As demonstrated by the above two cases, the case law of the CCPA-
which is important because it was later adopted by the Federal Circuit-
evolved along with that of the various courts of appeals. 363 The CCPA
explained that the presumption of validity always exists, regardless of
whether the PTO considered relevant prior art.364 The court, however,
adopted the clear and convincing standard of proof without explanation or
consideration of the way circuit courts were contemporaneously treating the
issue.365 In addition, the CCPA applied this burden and did so without
regard to the normal considerations for selecting a burden of proof.36 6
352. See Solder Removal Co. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 582 F.2d 628, 632 (C.C.P.A.
1978).
353. 629 F.2d 682 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
354. Id. at 683.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 688.
357. Id. (citing Stevenson v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 612 F.2d 546, 550 (C.C.P.A. 1979)).
358. See generally Stevenson v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 612 F.2d 546 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
359. 582 F.2d 628 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
360. Id. at 632.
361. Id. at 633.
362. Id.
363. See infra notes 367-68 and accompanying text.
364. Solder Removal Co., 582 F.2d at 633.
365. See Astra-Sjuco, A.B. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 629 F.2d 682, 688 (C.C.P.A.
1980).
366. See id.
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C. The Federal Circuit
When it was established, the Federal Circuit merged the CCPA and the
appellate division of the U.S. Court of Claims.367 The court's first decision
adopted the bodies of law of these two courts as precedent. 368 Thus, the
Federal Circuit initially followed the reasoning in Solder Removal from the
CCPA and treated the presumption of validity "like all legal presumptions,
[as] a procedural device, not substantive law."369 According to the court,
the presumption of validity imposed a "procedural burden of proceeding
first and establishing a prima-facie case" of invalidity, but had nothing to do
with the burden of persuasion.370
A year later in SSIH Equipment S.A. v. U.S. International Trade
Commission,371 the court confronted the plaintiffs contention that a claim
in the relevant patent was invalid for obviousness 372 (although it was really
anticipation).373  The defendant argued that there must be clear and
convincing evidence of invalidity to overcome the presumption. 374 The
court, however, found it "inappropriate to speak in terms of a particular
standard of proof being necessary to reach a legal conclusion." 375 It further
explained that standards of proof relate to "specific factual questions" and
that the "legal conclusion on validity . . . is a matter reserved for the
court."
3 7 6
Shortly thereafter, the Federal Circuit heard an appeal from a district
court's judgment notwithstanding a jury's verdict that a patent was valid.377
The court affirmed the judgment because "the facts underlying the jury's
nonobviousness conclusion were not supported by substantial evidence. '378
Even though not required, the court continued on to discuss "some
statements appearing in the [trial court's] opinion." 379 In response to the
district court's assertion that introduction of prior art not considered by the
PTO lessens the burden from clear and convincing proof to proof by a mere
preponderance, the court expanded on its position in SSIH Equipment.380
367. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 117, 96 Stat.
25, 32 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
368. S. Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
369. Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
370. Id.; see B. D. Daniel, Heightened Standards of Proof in Patent Infringement
Litigation: A Critique, 36 AIPLA Q.J. 369, 388 (2008) (arguing that this view of the
presumption "could have been supported as a matter of statutory construction, because...
this was the general understanding of how presumptions operated at the time the Patent Act
was passed.").
371. 718 F.2d 365 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
372. See id. at 374.
373. See Daniel, supra note 370, at 388.
374. SSIH Equip., 718 F.2d at 375.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. See Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
378. Id. at 1548.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 1549.
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The court reiterated that proof relates to facts, not legal presumptions, but
added that when a party seeks to prove facts to overcome the presumption,
"the evidence relied on to prove those facts must be clear and
convincing." 381
However, in American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc.,382 the
court surveyed § 282 of the Patent Act and described the case law
surrounding its presumption as "far from consistent-even
contradictory." 383 The court reasoned that "[b]ehind it all, of course, was
the basic proposition that a government agency such as the . . . Patent
Office was presumed to do its job. '384 The court went on to reaffirm that
existence of prior art not considered by the PTO does not affect the
presumption or change which party has the burden of proof.385 It went
further to assert that the presumption and who has the burden of proof "are
static and in reality different expressions of the same thing-a single hurdle
to be cleared. '386 Finally, the court stated that the standard of proof does
not change and "must be by clear and convincing evidence or its equivalent,
by whatever form of words it may be expressed. ' 387 When deciding the
applicable burden of proof, the Federal Circuit did not consider that the
circuit courts conflicted regarding what standard of proof was required to
overcome the presumption, nor did it discuss the considerations for
selecting a burden of proof.388
Following American Hoist, the Federal Circuit quickly adopted the clear
and convincing evidence standard for validity defenses. 389 The Federal
Circuit has only once applied a lower standard of proof to a validity
issue.390  In the case, Environ Products, Inc. v. Furon Co., 3 9 1 three
claimants had co-pending patent applications.392 The court held that "[t]he
correct standard of proof of priority of invention, as between co-pending
interfering patents, is the preponderance of the evidence. '393
The case law predating the establishment of the Federal Circuit shows
that the circuit courts did not agree on the applicable standard of proof to
381. Id.; see Daniel, supra note 370, at 389 ("In dicta ... [the court] simply decreed that
the evidence relied on to prove invalidity 'must be clear and convincing."' (quoting Connell,
722 F.2d at 1549)).
382. 725 F.2d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
383. Id. at 1359.
384. Id. (citing Morgan v. Daniels, 153 U.S. 120, 125 (1894)).
385. Id. at 1359-60.
386. Id. at 1360.
387. Id. (citing Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng'g Labs., Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 8 (1934)).
388. Id.
389. Daniel, supra note 370, at 394; see, e.g., Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De
Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating, without discussion, that "one
attacking validity has the burden of proving invalidity by clear and convincing evidence"
(citing Am. Hoist & Derrick Co.,725 F.2d at 1360)).
390. Daniel, supra note 370, at 394 n.136 (citing Environ Prods., Inc. v. Furon Co., 215
F.3d 1261, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
391. 215 F.3d 1261.
392. Id. at 1265-66.
393. Id. at 1266.
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overcome a patent's presumption of validity. 394 Once established, the
Federal Circuit did not consider this conflict and, when faced with the issue,
simply held that the presumption must be overcome by clear and
convincing evidence. 395 This heightened burden applies, according to the
Federal Circuit, regardless of what prior art is produced in support of
invalidity and whether or not it was considered by the PTO. 396
D. The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has not definitively stated what burden of proof is
required to overcome a patent's presumption of validity. However, a few
cases, including some that lower courts relied upon, were patent litigations
and thus implicitly involved the validity of a patent. The most recent case,
although not directly related to a patent's presumption of validity, included
specific language that gives reason to question the Federal Circuit's
treatment of the issue. 397
In American Hoist, the Federal Circuit cited the Supreme Court case
Morgan v. Daniels398 as support for the proposition that a patent's
presumption of validity is based on the thought that the PTO has done its
job.399 In Morgan, the parties disputed who was the true inventor entitled
to a patent.400 The Court characterized the suit as "a proceeding to set aside
the conclusions reached by the [PTO]."'401 As such, it was "not to be
sustained by a mere preponderance of evidence. ' 40 2 The Court did not
mention any presumption of validity and the case arose specifically because
of a dispute over PTO determinations of inventorship. 40 3
Another dispute over inventorship arose in Radio Corp. of America v.
Radio Engineering Laboratories, Inc.404 The Court, without discussion,
stated that the presumption of validity is "not to be overthrown except by
clear and cogent evidence."40 5  The Court reviewed different courts'
expressions quantifying the burden of proving invalidity and recognized the
"common core of thought and truth" among the cases as a requirement of a
heavy burden of persuasion.406 The Court did not base its decision on
deference to the PTO as the Federal Circuit did in American Hoist.407
394. See supra Part II.A.
395. See, e.g., Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1360 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
396. Id. at 1359-60.
397. See infra notes 408-12 and accompanying text.
398. 153 U.S. 120 (1894).
399. See Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 725 F.2d at 1359.
400. Morgan, 153 U.S. at 122.
401. Id. at 124.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 122.
404. 293 U.S. 1 (1934).
405. Id. at 2.
406. Id. at 7-8.
407. See id.; see supra note 384 and accompanying text.
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Most recently, the Court discussed the presumption of validity in KSR
International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.40 8 After addressing the Federal Circuit's
test for obviousness, the Court added,
We need not reach the question whether the failure to disclose [prior
art] during the prosecution of [the patent at issue] voids the presumption
of validity given to issued patents, for claim 4 is obvious despite the
presumption. We nevertheless think it appropriate to note that the
rationale underlying the presumption-that the PTO, in its expertise, has
approved the claim-seems much diminished here.409
The issue of the applicable burden of proof was not the question presented
to the Court by the petitioner.410 However, the standard was mentioned in
the respondent's brief and was therefore actually argued in the petitioner's
reply brief.411 Despite the Court not having to reach the issue of the effect
of prior art not considered by the PTO, it found it "appropriate" to note that
a large part of the justification for the presumption, deference to the PTO, is
"much diminished. '412
The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue of the burden of
proof required to overcome the statutory presumption of validity. Its case
law touching on the subject, which the Federal Circuit relied upon, dealt
with disputes over inventorship and occurred before the presumption of
validity became statutory and in fact before the creation of the Federal
Circuit.413 Although the Federal Circuit has long required clear and
convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of validity-even when
confronted with evidence not considered by the PTO-the Supreme Court
has recently given reason to question this heightened burden. 414
III. THE BURDEN OF PROOF SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED AND LOWERED
This Note has explained the historical conflict among the circuits
regarding the burden of proof required to overcome the presumption of
patent validity and the subsequent uniform adoption of the clear and
convincing standard in the Federal Circuit. It has also discussed the recent
resurgence of support for a preponderance of the evidence standard,
especially where the PTO did not consider relevant prior art in its patent
application examination. The proper course going forward is for the court
to reconsider the application of a clear and convincing standard and lower
the burden to a preponderance of the evidence. This change of course is
408. 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
409. Id. at 426.
410. See Brief for Petitioner at i, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007)
(No. 04-1350).
411. See Brief for the Respondents at 7, 13, KSR Int'l Co., 550 U.S. 398 (No. 04-1350);
Reply Brief for Petitioner at 18-20, KSR Int'l Co., 550 U.S. 398 (No. 04-1350).
412. KSR Int'l Co., 550 U.S. at 426.
413. See supra notes 55-58, 65-69, 399-407 and accompanying text.
414. See supra notes 389-90, 409 and accompanying text.
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supported by precedent, the amount of deference due to the PTO, and the
general considerations in selecting a burden of proof.
Part III examines the justification for lowering the burden of proof to a
preponderance of the evidence. Part III.A argues that the Federal Circuit
should have considered the conflict among the circuit courts concerning
what burden of proof should apply. Part III.B argues that a strong reason
for the heightened burden-administrative deference-is not justified
because of PTO procedures and because the PTO should only be accorded
Skidmore deference. Part III.C asserts that the policy considerations for
selecting a burden weigh in favor of a preponderance of the evidence
standard to overcome a patent's presumption of validity.
A. Precedent for a Preponderance
Since 1982, the Federal Circuit has had jurisdiction over most appeals in
patent cases.415 Before the Federal Circuit was established, however, the
appeals courts for the various circuits heard patent appeals. 416 The circuits
disagreed about what burden of proof should be applied to overcome the
presumption of patent validity. 417 Although multiple courts applied a
heightened burden, some did not express specifically what burden applied
and simply held that the burden was more than a preponderance, either clear
and convincing or beyond a reasonable doubt.418
There were three circuits that applied a preponderance of the evidence
standard.419 These circuits recognized that in the usual patent case where
invalidity is at issue, where the concern for parol or unreliable evidence is
not present, a heightened standard is not justified.420 They also correctly
noted that the presumption of patent validity has no evidentiary value and
merely operates to place the burden on the party asserting invalidity.42'
The CCPA also adopted the clear and convincing standard, but without
any explanation or consideration of the circuit courts' precedent. 422 The
CCPA correctly held that the presumption is never destroyed, even when
invalidity is supported by prior art not considered by the PTO. 423 This
precedent is important because the Federal Circuit adopted it when it was
created in 1982.424
The Federal Circuit started down the correct path by reaffirming that the
presumption never disappears. 42 5 It was also correct in maintaining that a
415. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
416. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
417. See supra Part IIA.
418. See supra Part II.A.1.
419. See supra Part II.A.2.
420. See supra Part 1I.A.2.
421. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
422. See supra notes 353-58 and accompanying text.
423. See supra notes 359-62 and accompanying text.
424. See supra note 368 and accompanying text.
425. See supra notes 385-86 and accompanying text.
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burden of proof does not apply to a legal conclusion, such as invalidity.426
The court erred, however, in taking a giant leap from its precedent and
holding in American Hoist that the presumption must be overcome by clear
and convincing evidence. 427  When the Federal Circuit addressed the
question of the applicable burden of proof, it did not adequately address the
motivations for selecting a burden of proof as outlined by the Supreme
Court, nor did it address the conflict in the circuit courts of appeals. 428
Thus, the selection of a clear and convincing standard was not thoroughly
supported, and, at a minimum, the court should reconsider its application of
a heightened burden.
Moreover, with respect to invalidity claims that are supported by
evidence not considered by the PTO, the Federal Circuit has firmly held
that the presumption of validity still applies and the burden of proof to
overcome it is not lowered. 429 This position with respect to the existence of
the presumption of validity is supported by the statutory language because
the statute does not make the presumption applicable in some situations but
not in others. 430  The statute firmly declares that "[a] patent shall be
presumed valid," unqualified by the type of litigation in which the patent is
involved or what evidence supports a claim of invalidity.431 The court
should reconsider its position with respect to the burden of proof when the
PTO did not consider material evidence. Applying a heightened burden of
proof directly conflicts with unanimous circuit court precedent. The
Federal Circuit did not adequately consider this precedent when deciding
what burden applies, and it should have done so.
B. Deserving Deference?
1. PTO Procedures
The PTO is struggling. It must evaluate many patent applications with
insufficient resources. For example, 485,312 patent applications were filed
in 2008 alone. 432 The PTO is currently staffed by approximately 6000
patent examiners, but examiners spend an average of eighteen hours over a
two- to three-year period examining each patent application. 433 Although
the PTO examiners are experienced and their expertise is due deference,
that deference does not support a clear and convincing standard.
426. See supra notes 369-76 and accompanying text.
427. See supra notes 382-87 and accompanying text.
428. See Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1358-60 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
429. See supra notes 382-87 and accompanying text.
430. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
431. Id.
432. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 19.
433. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 20, at 11; see Allison & Lemley,
supra note 20, at 2101 (noting that the average time that a patent takes to issue is 2.77 years);
Lemley, supra note 20, at 1500 (stating that examiners spend eighteen hours over two to
three years examining an application).
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The proceedings within the PTO are ex parte in nature.434 For that
reason, patents are evaluated with input from only the applicant and the
examiner, not third parties. 435 Not only are examiners overburdened by the
sheer number of patent applications, but they also may have inadequate
access to prior art.4 36 In addition, a patent applicant enjoys significant
advantages that favor patentability during examination.437 The PTO issues
patents based on a preponderance of the evidence. 438  All of these
limitations taken along with the statutory presumption of validity tip the
balance greatly in favor of the patentee. The patentee already enjoys
significant benefits; those challenging a patent should not have to overcome
both those benefits and the added hurdle of a heightened burden of proof to
overcome the patent's presumption of validity. In order to balance out
those benefits already enjoyed by the patentee, the burden of proof should
be lowered to a preponderance of the evidence.
2. Administrative Deference
The PTO, as an administrative agency, is presumed to have done its
job.439 When the PTO grants (or denies) a patent, it makes both factual
findings and legal determinations.440 These legal determinations are due
deference from the courts, but the factual findings are reviewed for
"substantial evidence." 441 This standard of review does not necessitate a
heightened burden of proof.
With respect to its legal determinations, the deference due to the PTO
depends on whether its proceedings qualify as formal adjudications. 442
Because the PTO does not have substantive rulemaking authority and
because patent applications are reviewed in an ex parte, informal fashion,
the PTO is likely due Skidmore, as opposed to Chevron, deference.443
Thus, the PTO's ultimate determination of patentability, a legal decision,
deserves respect, but is not conclusive. A reviewing court will consider the
thoroughness of the PTO's examination to determine how much weight to
give the legal determinations.444  Considering the nature of patent
examination in conjunction with the fact that examiners are overburdened,
the PTO's legal decisions, while entitled to respect, should not be
conclusive and do not warrant a heightened burden of proof. In fact,
considering that the PTO awards patents upon only a preponderance of the
434. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 8, ch. 5, at 6.
435. Id.
436. Id. ch. 5, at 7.
437. See id. ch. 5, at 9.
438. See id. ch. 5, at 26.
439. See supra note 384 and accompanying text.
440. See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
441. See supra Part I.C.
442. See supra Part I.C. 1.
443. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 147, at 299 (asserting that the PTO's legal
determinations probably deserve Skidmore deference).
444. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
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evidence, courts should only require a preponderance of the evidence to
prove that the patent is in fact invalid.
The situation changes when invalidity is asserted in litigation and the
claim is supported by evidence the PTO did not consider when initially
awarding the patent. In this case, since the PTO did not consider the
evidence there is no agency decision to which to defer. As the circuit courts
unanimously recognized, when evidence was not considered by the PTO,
the reasons to defer to the PTO "no longer exist. ' 445 As asserted by two
commentators, "[u]nder standard administrative law doctrine (and as a
matter of logic), no deference can be owed to factfinding that the PTO has
not done." 446 There is no support, as far as administrative deference is
concerned, for a clear and convincing burden of proof when evidence not
considered by the PTO is asserted in support of an invalidity claim. The
presumption that a patent is valid still applies even when prior art is
asserted that was not considered by the PTO, but a preponderance of the
evidence standard should be required to overcome it.
C. Policy Considerations for Choosing a Burden
As the Supreme Court has noted, choosing a burden of proof is "'more
than an empty semantic exercise."' 447 Because the statute assigning the
burden of proof to the party asserting invalidity does not assign a weight to
that burden, the courts must assign one. 448 Patent infringement litigation,
even if invalidity of the patent is at issue, does not involve the type of
fraudulent or "quasi-criminal" behavior the Supreme Court has said is the
typical case in which the clear and convincing standard is applied.449 A
patent validity dispute is much more like the typical civil case with
individual parties disputing over money. 450 The rights involved in patent
cases in which the burden of proof is at issue do not rise to the level of
"particularly important individual interests" that courts have protected by
applying a heightened burden of proof.451 The interests involved in patent
infringement litigation usually revolve around the validity and infringement
of the patent and the resulting economic loss from that infringement. 452
This type of litigation is exactly the civil monetary dispute that the Supreme
Court has explained is a case in which a preponderance of the evidence
standard is applied.453
Moreover, the public has an important interest in invalidating bad
patents. Bad patents undermine the delicate balance that Congress has
445. Baumstimler v. Rankin, 677 F.2d 1061, 1066 (5th Cir. 1982); see supra Part II.A.3.
446. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 147, at 293.
447. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (quoting Tippett v. Maryland, 436
F.2d 1153, 1166 (4th Cir. 1971) (Sobeloff, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)).
448. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
449. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
450. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
451. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
452. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
453. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
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struck between free competition and the limited monopolies awarded by
patents. Owners of nondeserving patents can obtain royalties and benefits
from a patent that should not have been granted.454 Bad patents can, in
essence, "tax legitimate business activity. '455  Applying a heightened
burden of proof in litigation places a large hurdle in front of potential
challenges to validity, directly conflicting with the policy of promoting
invalidation of bad patents. Since it is just as important to invalidate bad
patents as it is to uphold meritorious ones, courts ought to evenly allocate
the "risk of error" between the parties by applying a preponderance of the
evidence burden of proof.4 56 The clear and convincing standard places a
hurdle in front of the challenging party and benefits the patent owner.
Since the challenger's interest in invalidating the patent is, at a minimum,
as strong as the patentee's interest in upholding its patent, courts should
apply a preponderance of the evidence in order to put the parties on equal
footing.
D. A Dual Standard Is Not Workable
The argument for a lower burden of proof is slightly stronger when the
PTO did not consider evidence presented at trial to prove invalidity.
However, having a dual standard in patent validity litigation would pose
application problems. When invalidity is asserted, the court would have to
decide whether the PTO "actually considered" the asserted evidence, an
inquiry it does not currently have to undertake.457 This would require
"collateral litigation to determine the appropriate burden of proof," and
courts would likely have difficulty determining whether prior art was
considered. 458 To avoid increased litigation and judicial inquiry into the
PTO's treatment of certain evidence, a dual standard should not be adopted,
and the burden of proof should be lowered to a preponderance of the
evidence regardless of what evidence is presented at trial.
CONCLUSION
The courts have imposed a clear and convincing evidence standard where
Congress did not prescribe one. Although it is the court's job to impose a
burden of proof where Congress is silent, this burden of proof should be
revisited. It is important to uphold valid patents and give teeth to the
statutory presumption of validity. However, it is equally important that
454. See Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption of
Validity, 60 STAN. L. REv. 45, 48 (2007) (explaining that "[u]nder normal circumstances" the
patent system "encourages both the creation of new ideas and their dissemination," but
"[p]atents that are issued wrongly, however, do not follow this pattern").
455. Id.
456. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
457. See Response of Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant-Cross Appellant Alcatel-Lucent
USA Inc. (Formerly Lucent Technologies Inc.) to Microsoft Corporation's Petition for
Rehearing En Banc at 13, Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., Nos. 2008-1485, -1487,
-1495 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 9, 2009).
458. See id. at 14.
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invalid patents are not enforced in litigation as a result of an inappropriately
heavy burden of proof. The Federal Circuit should consider the precedent
from the courts of appeals decided before the Federal Circuit was created,
something it did not do when it initially imposed a heightened burden of
proof. The court should also consider the deference due to Patent Office
decisions keeping in mind the many benefits a patentee enjoys during
examination and the overburdened state of the Patent Office. It is time for
the court to reconsider its burden of proof and realign it with general
principles for selecting a burden of proof and the important interest society
has in enforcing only valid patents.
